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Abstract: Muslims, especially in southern Thailand, have been struggling to 
lead their lives according to SharÊ’ah. They have been demanding independence 
or at least autonomy especially for the southern part of Thailand from the 
central government. Their aim is to transform the socio-economic and political 
set-up in the South along IslÉmic lines. They began with the demand for Shariah 
Courts to be established in the region. This struggle for SharÊ’ah court is in 
accordance with the fundamental right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that stipulates that every person has the right to practice his/her 
religion. This is also required by religion. Muslims are under obligation to live 
according to the IslÉmic way of life and to settle disputes among fellow 
Muslims through SharÊ’ah courts. However, Muslims are denied the right to 
SharÊ’ah court. There are no procedural laws and adequate substantive laws to 
govern their practical lives. The mass media highlights the insurgency that is 
taking place in southern Thailand but not the inequality and injustices Muslims 
face in the region. Muslims have been marginalized in almost every aspect 
despite being the citizens of the kingdom. This paper analyses the current 
situation regarding the status of SharÊ’ah courts in Thailand, analyses albeit 
briefly the injustices meted out to the Muslims and argues for granting the right 
to SharÊ’ah court in Thailand.  
Keywords: SharÊ‟ah courts, Muslims in Thailand, Dato‟ Yuthitam, Human 
rights. 
Introduction 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that every person has the right 
to practice their religion.
1
 This right, however, is denied to Muslims in Thailand 
and they are required to settle their disputes in the subordinate civil courts to 
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which is attached a Muslim judge with the power to advise. Muslims have been 
demanding for independence or autonomy from the central government. At the 
minimum, they asked for the establishment of SharÊ’ah courts which will partially 
permit them to live in accordance with the tenets of IslÉm. The fulfillment of this 
demand would pave the way for further Islamization of the South. This calls for a 
close analysis of their struggle for the SharÊ’ah courts.  
SharÊ’ah courts, it is argued, will ensure that the rulings of SharÊ’ah are not 
only implemented but also technically enforced and applied to the Muslims. 
SharÊ’ah is not simply to understand and study the sources of Shariah, but one has 
to look beyond that: into the objectives of SharÊ’ah i.e to uphold justice and to 
protect public interest which is inevitably the essence of SharÊ’ah itself. SharÊ’ah 
is often misunderstood as the sole divine law and exclusively for God. In fact, 
SharÊ’ah is a divine as well as man-made law and it is for the benefit of 
humankind. A judge in a SharÊ’ah Court could, to a certain extent, “enact” a law 
and enforce it to disputant parties in his court. The role of judge in a court 
institution is to use his creativity by looking into existing laws and power vested 
on him before giving a decision. This role could only be utilized if he is given a 
proper jurisdiction and power to enforce the laws. Otherwise, laws can only be 
observed and looked at but not tested. Any law if not tested will remain useless, 
be it IslÉmic or Common law. The demand for SharÊ’ah courts in Thailand is, 
therefore, not simply for an institution but an institution that would symbolize 
IslÉm and ensure that IslÉmic law is followed. 
This article aims at answering the following questions: What is the nature and 
status of SharÊ’ah courts in southern Thailand? How are disputes among Muslims 
settled in Thailand? What kind of struggle is being made to have SharÊ’ah courts 
established in the country and with what effect? The paper is descriptive and is 
based upon informal discussion with those well versed in Thai politics and history 
and documentary evidence.  
Muslims in Thailand 
The Kingdom of Thailand, once known as Siam, occupies the center of the South 
East Asian mainland. It is the only country in Southeast Asia that has not been 
subjected to any form of colonialism. The census of April 1, 2000 gave the 
population of Thailand to be more than 60 million which, in 2014, is estimated to 
be about 61.5 million of whom about 5 million are Muslims. Like Singapore and 
the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand also has a Muslim minority. Muslims in 
Thailand can be divided into four categories. The first group is the Muslim Thai, 
those who are ethnically and culturally Thai and live in the central part of 




Thailand. The second group is the Chams who are originally from western 
Cambodia and live in the east coast district and Bangkok. The third group consists 
of Persians, Bengalis/Punjabis and Arabs many of whom are prominent 
businessmen. The last group is Thai Malays who speak and write in Malay or 
Yawi (Jawi). These people, estimated to be 3.5 to 4 million, live in the Southern 
part of Thailand consisting of Patani, Narathiwat, Satun and Yala. It is in the 
southern part where Muslims suffer injustices and inequalities and have seen the 
so-called insurgency. These people can be categorized as unassimilated group and 
predominantly Malays retaining Malay names, culture, language, music and attire. 
Those residing in other parts of Thailand converse in Thai both at home and in 
public. They are no longer familiar with the languages of their ancestors (Imtiyaz 
Yusuf, 1999: 20). 
Muslims living in the south are locally known as Malay Muslim
2
 or Thai 
Muslim
3
 and sometimes they are called as Khaek
4
 which means dark skinned 
foreign visitors or immigrants. This term is pejorative and symbolizes the general 
unease of the Muslim position vis a vis the majority people. Khaek also refers to 
people of different religion (Joy, 2007: 261-262). The Muslims in southern 
Thailand deeply resent such labeling for they are neither foreign visitors nor 
immigrants. They are actually the locals of southern provinces and part of Patani 
Kingdom. It is a historical accident that the Patani region had been incorporated 
into Thailand in the early part of the twentieth century. The Thai Muslims did not 
like the term at all since they argue that their arrival preceded the Thai Buddhists 
by several centuries (Gowing 1985: 185; Thomas, 1982: 159). 
Historically, the first Thai kingdom was established in Sukhotai in 1253 to 
1350 C. E. (Wyatt, 2000; Slagter, 2000: 16). It continued as a monarchy until 
1932 when a bloodless coup brought to an end the absolute rule of King 
Prajadhipok. They drafted and promulgated the first constitution in Thailand and 
forced the King to relinquish his absolute status and become a constitutional 
monarch. The government that emerged was essentially dominated by the military 
and noted for the non-participation of the people (Uwanno and Burns, 1998: 29).  
                                                          
2
  The term Malay Muslim is used to describe the Malay Muslim speaking populations who have 
generally resisted assimilation into Thai society and culture (Farouk, 1981: 97). 
3
  The term Thai Muslim is used to describe the Thai speaking Muslims of Thailand who have 
internalized much of Thai culture.   
4
  Literally it means guests. However, it has been argued that this term is used specifically to 
Muslim. If he is a Cham or Chinese and lives in Thailand he is not known as Khaek (Gilquin, 
2005: 23). 
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IslÉm in Thailand was institutionalized from the time of the arrival of Sheikh 
Ahmad at the beginning of 7
th
 century. He is a figure of considerable political 
importance and occupied the position of personal advisor to the King on matters 
concerning IslÉm (Gilquin, 43). He was given the title of Jaw Phraya, the title 
given to a noble man of the highest rank (Tohmeena, 1997: 13).  
The King is the spiritual head of all religions including IslÉm by virtue of the 
Section 9 of the 1997 Constitution. His personal advisor is the office of 
Chularajmontri or Sheikh al IslÉm who is appointed by the King on the 
recommendation of the Interior Minister. The office of Chularajmontri represents 
all the Muslims in Thailand and presides over a national council of IslÉmic affairs. 
Chularajmontri was an old office dating back to the 17
th
 century during Ayutthaya 
Kingdom. These Chulas are from Shiite descendants compared to Sunni Muslims 
in Southern Thailand. 
Application of IslÉmic law in Thailand 
The history of the application of IslÉmic law in Thailand can be traced to as early 
as 1900. On December 10, 1901, a Royal Decree was passed but it was not 
applicable to the Non-Muslims in Thailand (Pitsuwan, 1982: 119). Article 32 of 
the Royal Decree provides that the criminal and civil code shall be applied except 
in civil cases concerning husband and wives, and inheritance in which Muslims 
are both the plaintiff and the defendant or only a defendant. In such cases, the 
IslÉmic law shall be applied (Pitsuwan, 1982: 120). During the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (RamaV, 1868-1910), the Rule of Administration in the Seven 
Principalities was enacted in 1902 and the special court for the Muslims was set 
up as part of the Provincial Court. This rule remains valid until today and article 
32 reads as follows: 
The Criminal Code and the Civil Code shall be applied to Thai citizens 
except in civil cases concerning husbands and wives, and inheritance 
cases in which both parties are Muslims or a Muslim is a defendant, in 
such cases, the IslÉmic law shall be applied. 
There was also a Chinese court to cater to the needs of the Chinese from Mainland 
China (Pitsuwan, 1982: 12-13). 
In 1917, there was a royal demand for Satun to apply IslÉmic law and the 
appointment of Datok Yuthitham. As a result, SharÊ’ah Court was established and 
the Promulgation Act concerning IslÉmic law was applied. Historical evidence 
shows that there was a SharÊ’ah Court in Satun during the reign of King Rama V 
of Krung Ratna Kosin. However, in 1909 when Satun was separated from Sai Buri 






ah Court was abolished. But 8 years later, the operation of 
Shari
c
ah was resumed (Tohmeena, 1997: 17). 
The then Prime Minister, General Phibun Songkhram abolished the position 
of Datuk Yuthitham and the application of IslÉmic law in four southern provinces 
in 1943. In the same year, another law, known as Civil and Commercial Code 
Book 5 and 6, was passed. General Phibun overthrew Thailand‟s absolute 
monarchy in June 1932. He was responsible for stimulating Thai nationalism 
(Leifer, 1995: 190-191). The Civil and Commercial Code Book 5 and 6 abolished 
the application of IslÉmic law relating to marriage and inheritance to Thai 
Muslims. The General sought to “siamise” the entire non-Buddhist minority 
including the Muslims (Gowing, 1985: 183-84). In other words, he believed that 
uniformity in Thailand could only be achieved through a single system of law and 
converting the Muslims into Thai legal system. He believed that enacting a special 
law for Muslims is like treating them as a special group with special rights. To a 
certain extent, he succeeded in converting Muslims to Buddhism (Gowing, 1985: 
183-84). 
In one of his addresses to his cabinet and senior officials, General Phibun said: 
In an effort to build a nation with a firm and everlasting foundation, the 
government is forced to reform and reconstruct various aspects of 
society, especially its culture which here signifies growth and beauty, 
orderliness, progress uniformity and the morality of the nation (Baker & 
Phongchit, 2005: 140). 
With that policy, he had introduced The National Culture Act of instilling Thai-
ness and Thai nationalism. This policy was short-lived and done away with when 
General Phibun fell from power in 1944 (Baker and Phongchit, 2005: 140).  
The Civil Code was abolished in 1946 and Muslims were allowed to apply 
IslÉmic law concerning marriage and divorce. This development is the result of 
intense discussion between the government officials and Muslim leaders from 
Pattani. Consequently, the Royal Act of 1946 was established. According to 
Section 3 of the Royal Act: 
IslÉmic Family Law and Inheritance shall be applied in the Court of First 
Instance in Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun where Muslims are both 
the plaintiff and the defendants or a Muslim files the request in non-
contentious cases. 
The position and status of Muslim Thais have been taken care of during the 
period of King Chulalongkorn. The wish of the wise King Chulalongkorn 
concerning his Muslim subjects was not to suppress and destroy their Muslim 
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Malay and IslÉmic identity but to make them feel that even though they are 
Muslims and are of different faith, they are Thais in sentiment and outlook just as 
any other Thai. This has since become the socio political goal of subsequent Thai 
leaders (Pian, 2002: 7). It could be surmised that had the 1932 revolution not 
taken place, the interest and welfare of the Muslim communities might not have 
been overlooked by subsequent Thai governments. 
Under the 1997 Constitution, the King of Thailand provides the royal 
patronage to all religions in Thailand including IslÉm. Over 95 percent of the 
people of Thailand practice Buddhism with IslÉm accounting for most of the 
remaining 5 percent (totaling about 3.5 million). Muslims live mostly in the 
Southern part of Thailand that consists of Pattani, Narathiwat, Satun and Yala. 
These provinces were once parts of the old Malay Kingdom of Pattani (Che Man, 
1996: 425). Despite the government‟s attempt to cultivate the sense of Thai 
nationalism among the Thai population, the Muslim‟s sense of ethnicity and faiths 
has kept them apart (Pitsuwan, 1982: 28). The Government plays limited role in 
Muslim religious affairs. The Government maintains some kind of relationship 
with the Muslim community through various ministries and councils. 
In the same year, 1997, the government of Thailand issued a new act called 
the Royal Act Concerning the Administration of IslÉmic Organizations B.E. 2540 
(C. C. 1997). This act pertained to some IslÉmic organizations such as 
Chularajmontri office, the Central and Provincial IslÉmic Committee and the 
Mosques Committee. IslÉmic Law is placed within the jurisdiction of provincial 
courts and is available only in Yala, Satun, Pattani and Narathiwat. There are 5 
provincial courts that cater for the needs of Muslims in four southern provinces in 
Thailand.
5
 The jurisdiction of IslÉmic law in Thailand is limited only to marriage, 
divorce and inheritance.
6
 According to the Act, on the Application of IslÉmic Law 
in the Territorial Jurisdictions of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun Provinces 
(B.E. 2489), the IslÉmic law on family and succession shall apply to all Muslims 
who are residing in those provinces. 
Dato’ Yuthitam 
The person who caters for SharÊ’ah in Thailand is known as Datuk Yuthitam 
(Uwanno and Sathurathai, 1987: 88). The designation was created under the Act 
                                                          
5
  In Yala there are two Shariah Courts. One is in the city of Yala and another one is in Betong.  
6
  Section 3 of the Act of Exercising of Islamic Law in Pattani, Narthiwat, Yala and Satun, B.E. 
2489 




of Exercising IslÉmic Law in Territorial Jurisdiction of Pattani, Yala, Satun and 
Narathiwat in B.E. 2489. The post was created in 1945 by General Phibun prior to 
the Royal Act 1946 (Aphornsuwan, 2003: 22). This Act also mentions that in 
cases of personal laws, a civil court judge has to sit with Dato Yuthitam in the 
course of trial. Otherwise, the judgment of Dato‟ Yuthitam will have no legal 
effect.
7
 „Yuthitham‟‟ is a Thai word denoting justice whereas the word Dato’ is a 
Malay word for a venerable person. However, the Malays and Muslims in the 
South usually address the Muslim judges as “tok kadi”, as commonly referred to 
in much of the Malay World in Southeast Asia. 
The establishment of Dato‟ Yuthitam institution is sanctioned by the Royal 
Act of 1946, which provides for special concessions allowing the application of 
IslÉmic law in matters concerning family and inheritance. He is placed in the Thai 
Provincial Court in four southern provinces and his duty is mainly to assist the 
civil court judge. He was also known as a judge without a court. This means that 
Dato‟ Yuthitam is a judge without a proper organization, staff and place to hear a 
case. There are two Dato‟ Yuthitams in each province.  
Being an assistant to the civil court judge, he could not make his decision 
independently. In other words, the application of IslÉmic law for Muslims in 
Thailand is subject to the approval of the civil court judge. According to Mr. 
Apirat Mad Sae, a SharÊ’ah judge in Pattani, the civil court judges generally 
respect the kadi and follow their decision accordingly. There is no right of appeal 
should any party be dissatisfied with the decision. This is against natural justice in 
administrative law as well as in IslÉmic law. 
The power to appoint Dato‟ Yuthitam and to dismiss him is invested in the 
Ministry of Justice. This is provided in the Judicial Official Act 2000. Special 
procedure must be followed in appointing a Dato‟ Yuthitam. The vacancy of the 
post has to be announced by the regional director general of judges. Then the 
interested Muslims are invited to submit their application within a specified 
period. The candidate for the post must be a Muslim of Thai nationality; minimum 
30 years of age; and must have an education that is equivalent to lower secondary 
school. The Regional Director then consults the provincial Chief Judge and the 
Provincial Governor of their respective province to determine the qualifications 
and suitability of two Dato‟ Yuthitams in each provincial court. He is like any 
other civil servant eligible for pension after retirement at the age of sixty. In 
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Satun and Narathiwat in B.E. 2489 
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theory, Dato‟ Yuthitam plays an important role in settling disputes on family and 
inheritance matters. In practice, however, they play a negligible role since they 
receive very few cases per year to handle. 
As discussed above, Dato‟ Yuthitam‟s jurisdiction is limited to four southern 
provinces. Application and enforcement of IslÉmic law does not cover Muslims 
living outside these four provinces. A Muslim who lives in Bangkok and commits 
an offence that contravenes IslÉmic law is not liable to be prosecuted under the 
provision of IslÉmic law.  
Inequalities, injustices and demands for redress 
The historical analysis carried out above shows that Muslims in Thailand are the 
victims of inequalities and injustices. One, they have been labeled Khaek, a 
specific term used by the Thai majority to refer to Muslims in the sense that they 
are the “other”. Muslims are considered outsiders simply because they adhere to 
the religion of IslÉm. Understandably, Muslims resent such a labeling. Two, 
attempts have been made and are being made to convert Muslims into Buddhism. 
The largely Buddhist Thai government exert hegemonic pressures upon the 
Muslims, forcing linguistic changes, and infiltrating Muslim villages by placing 
Buddhist families there and constructing Buddhist monasteries in Muslim villages. 
Muslims have been seriously resisting these attempts in various ways. Muslims 
could resist the forced conversion but could do nothing to stop the conversion of a 
place into Buddhist areas. Three, Muslims are denied their right to have SharÊ’ah 
courts established. Instead, they are given Dato‟ Yuthitam whose jurisdiction is 
limited and who plays second fiddle to the civil court judge. Muslims outside the 
south of the country are subject to the civil law of Thailand. This has the effect of 
dividing the Muslims rather than uniting them as one religious community. Four, 
since the country‟s civil and commercial code takes effect throughout the country, 
a case settled by the civil court judge has the priority over the opinion of Dato‟ 
Yuthitam.  
In addition, Muslims and non-Muslims differ in the possession of what is 
desirable and undesirable. Muslims possess much less of what is desirable as 
compared to the non-Muslim citizens. Most Muslims are poor and live below the 
poverty line. They are small holders of rubber trees, small fisherman, and small 
agricultural farmers. Many of them are farm labourers or wage workers in the 
non-Muslim fishing enterprises. They also work as labourers in the non-Muslim 
owned mines. There is a clear bias against Muslims occupying top administrative 
positions or in terms of benefitting from economic development. Muslims are 




suspect and are arrested on mere suspicion and detained for months or years 
without trial. Most Muslims are devoid of qualifications to hold any professional 
job except as primary school teachers or religious teachers. Most of them are 
farmers, fishermen, rubber tappers and small traders. The Malay Muslims are 
reluctant to go to the national schools since they are afraid that their IslÉmic faith 
would be jeopardized.  
Given a myriad of sufferings, Muslims were engaged in movements led by 
the „ulamā to consciously influence changes from what is bad into what is good. 
One such movement was initiated by Haji Sulong Bin Haji Abdul Kadir who 
served as the President of the IslÉmic Religious Council in Thailand. The 
movement he established made the following seven specific requests to the 
government: 
1.  The four southern provinces to be governed as a unit, with a Muslim 
governor. 
2.  For the first seven years of the school curriculum, Malay to be allowed as 
the language of instruction. 
3.  All taxes collected in the four southern provinces to be expended there. 
4.  85 percent of the government officials to be local Malays. 
5.  Malay and Thai to be used as the languages of government. 
6.  The provincial IslÉmic committees to be given authority over the practice of 
IslÉm. 
7.  The IslÉmic judicial system to be separated from the provincial court system. 
Haji Sulong subsequently established a “Seven Requests” movement to 
pressure the government into considering the requests. The movement used the 
language of human rights and articulated their demands with a moral authority. It 
is a language which is recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR) adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The 
demand for SharÊ’ah courts is in conformity with the UNDHR which entitles all 
human beings to live in dignity, and in conditions of social justice. However, his 
demand fell on deaf ear and instead Muslims were asked to be satisfied with the 
institution of Dato‟ Yuthitham. Haji Sulong also demanded regional autonomy for 
the former lands of the Patani Sultanate, which was absorbed by the British into 
Malaysia, then given to Thailand. The demand for autonomy was justified on the 
ground that it would preserve special identity of the inhabitants as Malay 
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Muslims. He asked the government not to adopt a policy of converting Muslims or 
of marginalizing them by labeling them as outsiders. He wrote:  
We Malays are conscious that we have been brought under Siamese rule 
by defeat. The term Thai IslÉm with which we are known by the Siamese 
government reminds us of this defeat and is therefore not appreciated by 
us. We therefore beg of the government to honor us with the title Malay 
Muslims so that we may be recognized as distinct from the Thai by the 
outside world (Hayimasae, 2002: 83). 
However, none of the seven demands was met by the government. The Thai 
government dismissed Haji Sulong‟s activities and jailed him for over 3 years. 
Sometime after his release, Haji Sulong disappeared with his son, and some 
followers. He was found murdered and tossed into Songkhla Lake in 1954. News 
reports suggested that Haji Sulong had been killed by the police. Muslims, 
consequently, were agitated and some might have even supported radical groups 
who were bent upon destroying the peace of the country.  
Muslims intensified their demands asking for full independence to establish 
an IslÉmic republic which understandably incorporate SharÊ’ah courts. In 1963, 
the Pattani Malay National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional or 
BRN) was established with the demand for an independent IslÉmic Republic of 
Pattani comprising the southern provinces of Pattani, Satun, Yala, Narathiwat and 
Songkhla. In battles with the Thai Army, over 400 NLFP members were killed 
during 1971-1975. Soon, the BRN toned down its demand and opted for 
autonomy. In addition, the forces of the Communist Party of Thailand, operating 
in the southern region were working together with the various Muslim separatist 
movements. The Pattani United Liberation Army and Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULA and PULO) both pursued autonomy for the Pattani Province. 
PULO has advertised the sponsorship of killing state workers, law enforcement 
personnel, local government officials, school teachers and other symbols of Thai 
oppression, according to a report published by the Rand Corporation. A footnote 
to the Rand report says that between August 1997 and January 1998, at least 33 
separate attacks were carried out, killing nine, injuring several dozens along with 
considerable economic loses. The Malaysian government at the time was having 
its own problems in its northern area bordering Thailand. Both countries agreed to 
let each other‟s armies move freely in these areas to cleanse the area of the strife 
that was afflicting its home country. The mutual policing has since ceased around 
1990. The demand for autonomy continues and the struggle for the SharÊ’ah court 
remains in the forefront.  





Muslims in southern Thailand have been struggling for independence and 
subsequently for autonomy from the central government. They began making the 
minimum demand for the establishment of SharÊ’ah courts in southern Thailand 
hoping this to open the possibility for Muslims to live an IslÉmic way of life. 
Their demand for SharÊ’ah court is in conformity with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The Muslim demand for the SharÊ’ah court has been neglected 
for centuries. Unlike their counterparts in other ASEAN countries like Singapore 
and the Republic of the Philippines, Thai Muslims are treated with disdain. The 
establishment of shari
c
ah court is essential to ensure that basic rights of the 
Muslims to enjoy their personal status are protected. It is suggested that shari
c
ah 
court should be placed under specialized courts together with Labour Court, Tax 
Court, Intellectual Property & International Trade Court and Bankruptcy Court. 
This fundamental right is universally accepted by most of the countries.
8
 Other 
than that, there is a need to have proper procedural laws that would guide the 
Datok Yuthitham in arriving at juristic decisions. The Rule of Administration in 
the Seven Principalities which was enacted in 1902 should be amended and 
certain changes should be included such as the application of laws to all Muslims 
across the Kingdom of Thailand and details out the function Datok Yuthitham in a 
court. These demands are not radical but indeed, a fundamental right that need to 
be secured by the Muslims. The government policy should be modified by 
including the positive interest to boost the confidence of the Thai Muslims to the 
government. The government should also facilitate extensive communications 
between the majority and the minority. This can be facilitated through education. 
Eventually, this move will improve their status and the stigma of Khaek will be 
eliminated. What is more important is to instill a strong sense of belonging to the 
nation and the values of respect in every citizen in the Kingdom of Thailand.  
The findings however, show that the interest of the Muslims in Thailand 
scarcely receives attention from the central government. The authorities should try 
to resolve the conflict by looking into the root of the problems. The element of 
discrimination in Thailand society against the Muslims should be properly 
addressed. Unattended, this discrimination eventually would create the negative 
sentiments among the Thailand community. The policy of the Thai government 
concerning the southern provinces should be geared towards improving the quality 
of life of Muslims, the infrastructure and economy of those provinces.  
                                                          
8
  See for example Shariah Court in Singapore where Muslims are in the minority yet the personal 
rights of Muslims are well protected and administered. 
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